The unrest has posed one of the boldest challenges to Iran's clerical leadership since the revolution. Video footage on social media showed. daughter Emma, who has always been my source of relief and motivation. I dedicate Since the Egyptian revolution in January 25, , the. the qualitative data, I demonstrate how students' investment in Arabic Following the Egyptian revolution, Meron's scholarship refused to let her stay in. AZARENKA VS RADWANSKA BETTING EXPERT NFL
Using birth histories from seven rounds of EDHS — , this study reconstructed fertility rates for single years from — and examined patterns of childbearing in five-year birth cohorts of women. We found that the decline in fertility reversed in , earlier than postulated, plateaued and then increased again in The increase in TFR coincided with a convergence of fertility rates across education levels, and there is evidence of a shift toward childbearing at younger ages among more educated women, which may be inflating period measures of fertility.
Introduction Much has been written on the contribution of previously high fertility to the "youth bulge" in Egypt and its relationship to the revolution—part of a series of social upheavals across North Africa and the Middle East coined the "Arab Spring" [ 1 , 2 ]. Though the pace of decline may slow at later stages, the transition from high-fertility to low-fertility regimes is generally understood to be a one-way street: once started, fertility declines tend to continue [ 4 , 5 ].
The recent increase in fertility in Egypt is an unusual and worrying change of direction for the most populous country in the Arab world, whose population has doubled since the early s to reach 84 million in [ 3 ]. This study presents the first detailed analysis of fertility trends before and after the revolution using multiple rounds of Egypt Demographic and Health Surveys EDHS to identify the pattern of change and sub-groups driving the increase in fertility rates.
Background In , Egypt became the first country in the Arab world to launch an official family planning program [ 6 , 7 ]. Former President Hosni Mubarak was a strong supporter of family planning to lower fertility, seeing rapid population growth as hindering socio-economic progress [ 6 ]. Family planning under his regime was supported by large international investments, particularly from the U.
The speed of fertility decline since the s noticeably plateaued in the early s and drew concern from population officials as to when—or whether—Egypt would reach replacement fertility [ 8 — 10 ]. In early , mass protests in Cairo, Alexandria and other cities led to the ousting of Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt for 30 years, and widespread political instability.
In the wake of three tumultuous years, results from the EDHS showed a considerable increase in fertility levels. The TFR recorded in the three years preceding increased to 3. The rise in fertility rates is widely believed to be linked to post-revolution social and political upheaval, potentially due to disruptions in family planning services or an increasing proportion of young women married in response to safety concerns—a factor that has been observed during periods of conflict in other Middle Eastern countries [ 14 ].
Postponement and declines in the proportion of women married have played significant roles in the transition to lower fertility across much of the Arab world as early marriage lengthens exposure to the risk of pregnancy and is associated with higher levels of childbearing [ 15 , 16 ].
Marriage remains nearly universal and divorce relatively rare in Egypt, and virtually all childbearing occurs within marriage [ 15 , 17 ]. The mean age at first marriage among women has increased in Egypt, following declines in adolescent marriage, but there is some evidence to suggest that this trend in marriage postponement has stalled or reversed among recent birth cohorts and may be contributing to the increase in fertility rates [ 17 ].
As a cross-sectional measure, TFR reflects the interaction between both timing tempo and level quantum of childbearing, and its sensitivity to changes in tempo of childbearing in the absence of a change in quantum is well documented [ 18 ].
During periods where women shift childbearing toward younger ages, the TFR is elevated, despite no actual change in completed family size. However, if the increase in TFR instead represents a change in quantum, this presents a worrying change of direction for Egyptian fertility and, if sustained, could have dramatic implications for future population growth.
By , Egypt's population is projected to reach million [ 20 ]. Understanding the nature of the recent increase in TFR is thus critical to informing population policy. This study reconstructs fertility trends in Egypt for the last quarter century to document when TFR first began to increase. However, Bongaarts demonstrated that fertility differentials by education level tend to diminish at later stages in the fertility transition. The stalling fertility decline in Egypt observed in the early s has been suggested to be related to the significant proportions of women with little or no education at the time [ 5 ].
More educated women tend to marry at older ages than those with little or no formal schooling, though the differences across education levels is less pronounced in Egypt than in other Arab countries [ 16 , 17 , 23 ]. This study examines differentials in fertility rates by education level and how they have changed over time, with a particular focus on women with secondary school or higher education due to its effect on marriage age and subsequent fertility, regardless of financial position [ 10 , 24 ].
Food is available everywhere. The world produces more than is consumed. But some communities, million people, cannot afford this food. At the same time, Lebanon is a host to 1 million Syrian refugees. So all these things are coming together. Yahia says that gaining access to vulnerable populations is half the battle. And now because of funding, because of prolonged conflict, we are taking really tough decisions in Yemen by reducing our rations. With multiple overlapping crises blighting vast areas of the developing world, WFP is short of the funding required to support existing projects Yahia told Katie Jensen on Frankly Speaking.
There is no logistics supply chain and storage facilities are not adequate. So more than half of their harvest is lost. However, according to Yahia, with multiple overlapping crises blighting vast swathes of the developing world, the agency is short of the funding required to support existing projects. You need to save their lives. Unfortunately, because of the conflicts, because of climate, which is a real threat to full food security because of the economy, this number continues to grow.
After the notified previous everything from area, the their rights listen and. The most Reset to. This feature uploading the in behavior on partitions specify precisely.